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1. Introduction 
This paper deals with two-party disputes, in which both parties hold preferences over a set of 
alternatives and attempt to reach an agreement on one of them. If the agents fail in reaching 
an agreement, they fall back to some fixed status quo point. In the remainder, we refer to 
such situations as bargaining problems. In the literature, there exist two significantly different 
approaches to this class of problems: a welfarist and a non-welfarist approach. In the former, 
agents' preferences are represented by utility functions and solutions depend exclusively on the 
set of feasible utility pairs and the status quo (or disagreement) utilities. An advantage of this 
approach lies in its flexibility, since such solutions can be applied to a broad spectrum of choice 
problems. Shapley (1969), however, has shown that the welfarist approach does not allow for 
two-agent bargaining solutions which are both strictly individually rational and ordinal (i.e. 
invariant with respect to monotone transformations of the utility functions). 
In the non-,Yelfarist approach, the solution works directly on the agents' preferences. One 
advantage is that such solutions are, by definition, ordinal. However, existing non-welfarist 
solutions are defined for a specific context only, making them considerably less general than 
bargaining solutions of the welfarist type. In this paper, we attempt to reconcile the flexibility 
of the welfarist approach with ordinality. To this purpose, we present a solution, depending 
solely on the agents' preferences - not on their specific utility representation - which is general 
enough to be applied to a broad class of two-person bargaining problems, such as exchange 
economies, location problems and division problems. 
In contrast to the usual assumption in bargaining, the agents' preferences are assumed to be 
ordinal. This means that preferences are defined on the set of alternatives only, without making 
any assumption regarding the agents' evaluations of lotteries on this set. This implies that the 
set of alternath'es contains all objects which may be relevant in the bargaining problem. In 
particular, if agents' evaluations of lotteries are important for the outcome of the bargaining 
process, then these lotteries should already be incorporated into the set of alternatives. In this 
case, our model allows agents to have preferences over lotteries different from the von-Neumann-
Morgenstern type. 
The solution we present is best illustrated by means of an example. Consider an exchange 
economy with two agents and two perfectly divisible goods. Suppose that the agents have quasi-
concave preferences, which are strictly mono tonic in both goods. Let e be the initial endowment. 
For a given 7' between zero and one, consider the reduced Edgeworth box A(r), in which only a 
fraction l' of the initial endowment can be traded. The solution proposed in this paper selects 
the unique efficient allocation a* in the original exchange economy, for which we can find a 
reduced economy A(7') making each agent indifferent between a* and his best allocation in A(r). 
(See the figure below.) 
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In our general setup, the set of alternatives is an abstract, compact and convex set A. "'le 
consider a family of reduced subsets of alternatives A (1·), which can be viewed as an appropriate 
generalization of the reduced Edgeworth boxes defined above. More precisely, for every l' between 
zero and one, A (1') is a contraction of A around the status quo point, such that A (0) contains 
only the status quo point, A (1) is the entire set A and A (1·) is monotonically increasing in r. 
The solution is then defined in the same way as above: it selects those efficient alternatives a* 
for which some r can be found, such that both agents are indifferent between a* and their best 
choice in A (r) . 
In accordance with the Nash program, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the 
solution and a mechanism which implements it. The mechanism proposed is a simple offer-and-
counter-offer procedure, containing two rounds only. Being a sequential move mechanisms with 
perfect information, its outcomes can be predicted naturally by backward induction. Moreover, 
the mechanism does not contain chance moves. This should be so, since we have no information 
about agents' preferences over lotteries on A. In contrast to similar mechanisms proposed by 
Moulin (1984) and Crawford (1979), the role of first mover is given exogenously to one of the 
players, in this case player 1. Despite this fact, the outcome of the mechanism is anonymous, 
since the same outcome would be obtained if the role of first mover would be given to player 2. 
The two key axioms in the characterization of the solution are blow-up monotonicity and 
weal.: Masl.:in monotonicity. The former states that by contracting the set of alternatives around 
the status quo point no agent should be better off. Or, stated equivalently, blowing up the set 
of alternatives should be beneficial for both agents. This axiom can be interpreted as an equity 
principle: blowing up the set of alternatives, in many examples, increases the opportunities for 
both agents symmetrically, and therefore both agents should benefit from it. In an exchange 
economy, for instance, blowing up the Edgeworth box means allowing the agents to exchange 
a bigger proportion of the initial endowment. The opportunities for both agents are therefore 
increased symmetrically. 
\Yeak Maskin monotonicity states that an alternative, selected by the solution, should remain 
a solution outcome if the agents revise their preferences without changing the ranking of this 
particular alternative. It is a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity (1977), as the latter takes 
into account all preference transformations that do not decrease the ranking of the solution 
outcome. Together with efficiency and a uniqueness property, the above axioms characterize the 
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We define a particular solution 'IjJ in the following way. For every 7' E [0,1]' let 
A(r) = {(1- r)e +ral a EA} 
be a reduced set of alternatives. Geometrically, A(r) can be seen as a contraction of A around 
the status quo point e. Since A is convex we have that A(r) C A. Obviously, A(r) C A(r') 
if r :::; 7", A(O) = {e} and A(1) = A. Note that moving from the set A(r) to the set A(r') 
where 7" > 7', can be interpreted as "blowing up" the set of alternatives, while leaving the shape 
unchanged. For every l' E [0,1]' let bi (7') be a maximal element for agenti in the set A(7').1 
Definition. The solution 'IjJ is the correspondence assigning to every bargaining problem B = 
(A,e,tl,t2) tl1eset 
1/,(B) = {a E AI a efficient and 31' such that a "-'ibi(1') for both i}. 
Hence, in the solution 'ljJ, both agents are indifferent between the solution outcome and their 
best alternative in some reduced set A(7'), where A(7') is the same for both agents. 
2.2. Properties 
First of all, ,ye show that 'If;(B) is always nonempty. Consider, to this purpose, an arbitrary 
utility representationu = (UI, U2) of the preferences and the corresponding set u(A) of feasible 
utility pairs. 
PI 
UI 
Figure 2.1 
Let UI ,U2 be the agents' maximal feasible utilities. Let B = (uI(e),u2(e)) be the status 
quo utilities. Let PI = (UI , U2) E EFF(u(A» and P2 = (Ub U2) E EFF(u(A», where EFF 
denotes the set of efficient alternatives. Since the efficient frontier in u(A) is, by assumption, 
a connected set, it connects P2 with PI through a continuous, strictly decreasing curve. (See 
Figure 2.1). 
ISuch a maximal element exists since A(r) is compact, and agent i's preferences can be represented by a 
continuous utility function. 
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for all agent 1 strategies s~ and 
for all agent 2 strategies s~. The strategy profile s is a subgame perfect equilibrium in r if 
it constitutes a N"ash equilibrium in every subgame of r. An alternative a E A is said to be 
a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in r if there is a subgame perfect equilibrium s with 
a = a(s). 
The mechanism M is said to implement a solution cp in subgame perfect equilibrium if for 
every pair (~l' ~2) of preference relations, <p (A,e, ~l, ~2) coincides with the set of subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcomes in (M, ~l, ~2). 
Let the pair (A, e), consisting of the set of alternath'es and the status quo point, be given. 
Consider the following mechanism, which we call mechanism 11[*. 
Round 1. Agent 1 chooses a number l' E [O,IJ and proposes an alternative a l in the reduced 
set A(1-). Agent 2 can accept or reject the proposal. 
Round 2. If agent 2 has rejected the proposal, then agent 2 makes a new proposal a2 E A(r). 
The final outcome is a2. STOP 
If agent 2 has accepted the proposal, then agent 2 makes a new proposal a2 which can be 
any alternative in A. Agent 1 can accept or reject agent 2's proposal a2• If he accepts, the final 
outcome is a2 . STOP 
If he rejects, the final outcome is al. STOP 
This mechanism can be seen as some simple version of step-by-step negotiation as proposed 
by Kalai (1977). If agents do not reach an agreement at the second round, they fall back to 
the outcome reached at the first round. Note that the bargaining process in each round is 
very asymmetric: one agent makes a proposal and the other agent may simply accept or reject. 
However, the overall mechanism turns out to be anonymous. 
Theorem 3.1. Let (A, e) be given and let M* be the mechanism described above. Then, M* 
implements the solution 'ljJ in subgame perfect equilibrium. 
A formal proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix. In order to give the reader an 
intuition why the mechanism leads to the solution 'ljJ, we provide a graphical argument here. 
Let (UI,U2) be an arbitrary utility representation of the preferences and let u(A) be the set 
of feasible utility pairs. Let d = (uI(e),u2(e)) be the utilities of the status quo point. Then, 
(u(A), d) represents a "welfarist" bargaining problem, consisting of a set of feasible utilities and 
a disagreement point in this set. 
Let 11I(1') = ul(bl(1')) and u2(r) = u2(b2(1')) for every l' E [0,1]. Consider Figure 3.1, which 
represents the feasible set of utilities and the curve r 1---+ (uI(r), u2(r)). 
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this proposal and choose a final outcome yielding utilities (Ul (1'*), U2 (1'*)) . This outcome will be 
accepted by agent 1. Hence, the outcome of the mechanism coincides with the solution 'I/J. 
4. Axiomatic Characterization 
In this section, we show that the solution 'I/J is characterized by four axioms; efficiency, unique-
ness, blow-up monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity. 
Axiom 1. Efficiency (EFF). A solution cp is called efficient if for every bargaining problem 8, 
every a E cp (8) is efficient. 
Axiom 2. Uniqueness (UN). A solution cp is called unique if for every bargaining problem 8, 
e,'erya E cp(8) and every b E A it 11Olds: bE cp(8) if and only if b 'Vi a for both i. 
Uniqueness can thus be decomposed into two parts. First, it states that the solution always 
provides a unique outcome in terms of utilities. Moreover, every alternative which is equivalent, 
for both agents, to a solution outcome, should be a solution outcome itself. There should be no 
distinction, therefore, among alternatives yielding the same utility pairs. 
The follo\\"ing axiom states that blowing up the set of alternatives, without changing the 
shape of it, should be beneficial for both agents. 
Axiom 3. Blow-up monotonicity (BAJON). A solution cp is called blow-up monotonic if for 
every bargaining problem 8, every l' E [0,1], each a E cp(8) and each b E cp{8(1')) we have a ~i b 
for bot11 i. 
Here, 8(1') denotes the bargaining problem induced by the reduced set of alternatives A(1'). 
The axiom, together with uniqueness, is equivalent to saying that the utility curve l' 1---+ 
ui(cp(8{1°))) should be increasing in l' for both agents i, where ui(cp(8(1'))) should be read as the 
unique utility for agent i induced by the alternatives in cp(8(1')). The intuition behind the axiom 
is that, in most examples, blowing up the set of alternatives (i.eo changing from A(r) to A(1") 
where 1" ;::: 1') equally increases the opportunities for both agents. No agent should therefore be 
hurt by such a "fair" transformation. This idea of blowing up the domain is also present in the 
bargaining literature. Kalai (1977), for instance, considers blow-ups of the set of feasible utilities, 
leaving its shape invariant, and calls a bargaining solution homogenous if it is covariant with 
respect to these blow-ups. Also Wiener and Winter (1999) consider monotonically increasing 
sets of feasible utilities. Their motivation is that agents usually follow a gradual process in order 
to reach an agreement. They propose a solution, called the gradual solution, which assigns an 
outcome not only to the big pie, but to any nested pie belonging to some fixed sequence of pies, 
approximating the big one. Our approach is different from Kalai's and Wiener and Winter's, 
since we consider explicitly the underlying set of alternatives. It is important to note that the 
shape of the set of feasible utilities may change when blowing up the set of alternatives. 
The last a.'Idom states that an alternative pertaining to the solution should remain a solution 
outcome if agents revise their preferences without changing the indifference set, upper contour 
set and lower contour set with respect to this alternative. 
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Now, suppose that <.p is a solution satisfying EFF, UN, BMON and WMMON. Vle show that 
<.p = 'l/J. Let B be a bargaining problem and 0.* E <.p(B). By UN of <.p and 'l/J, it suffices to show 
that 0.* E 'IjJ(B). Let RI = {r E [0,1]1 0.* "'1 bl(r)}. By BMON and the fact that A(O) = {el, 
we have that 0.* tl bl (0) = e. Then, by using a simple continuity argument, it is easily seen 
that RI is a non-empty, closed interval. By assumption, 0.* is efficient. Hence, in order to prove 
that 0.* E 'l/J(B), it remains to show that 0.* "'2 b2(1') for some r E RI. Suppose not. Then, by a 
continuity argument, either 0.* >-2 b2(r) for all r E R1 or 0.* -<2 b2 (1') for all r E R1. 
Case 1. Let 0.* >-2 b2(1') for all r E RI. Let 1'* be the maximal element in RI. Suppose that 
1'* = 1. Since, by assumption, 0.* >-2 b2(1'*), it would follow that 0.* >-2 b2(1). However, this is not 
possible since b2(1) is agent 2's best alternative in A. So, we must have 1'* < 1. By construction, 
0.* -<1 bl (1') for all l' > r*. Since 0.* >-2 b2(1'*), we can find some f > 1'* with 0.* -<1 blU,;) and 
0.* >-2 b2(fl Now, choose preferences t~having a continuous utility representation, such that for 
all bE A 
[0.* t2 b {:} 0.* t~ b] and [a* ~2 b {:} 0.* ~~ b] 
and moreover 
a "'~ b for all a, bE A(1"';). 
Such preferences can be found since a* >-2 b for all b E A(1"';). Let B' = (A, e, tl, t~) be the 
bargaining problem where agent 2's preferences are substituted by the ones above. Since in 
B', agent 2 is indifferent between all alternatives in ACn, it is clear that every efficient point 
in A(n, "'ith respect to tl, t~, must be equivalent, for agent 1, to b1(1"';). By EFF, we know 
that cp(B'(1"';)) chooses only efficient alternatives in A(1";), so for every a E cp(B'(1";)), we have that 
a /'VI b1(il By BMON of <p, it follows that, for every a E <p(B'), a tl bl(il Since Band B' 
satisfy the conditions stated in the definition of WIHvlO)J, we know, by \VMMON of <.p, that 
0.* E cp(B'). However, this implies that 0.* t1 bl(r), which is a contradiction to the assumption 
above, that a* -<1 bl(il Hence, Case 1 is not possible. 
Case 2. Let a* -<2 b2(r) for all r E R1. Let R2 = {r E [0,1]1 a* "'2 b2(1'))}. Then, by 
construction,a* >-1 bl(r) for all r E R2. This case leads to a contradiction in the same manner 
as Case 1. One simply has to exchange the roles of agent 1 and 2. 
Hence, we may conclude that there must be some rE RI with 0.* "'2 b2(r). Hence, 0.* /'Vi bi (1') 
for both i and 0.* is efficient. This means that a* E 'l/J(B). By UN of cp and 'l/J, it follows that 
cp(B) = 'l/J(B) .• 
5. Examples 
5.1. Pure exchange economy 
Consider a pure exchange economy with two agents and two goods. Let e1 = (1,0) and e2 = (0,1) 
be the initial endowments of agents 1 and 2 respectively. Let e = (el, e2) be the status quo point. 
The space of alternatives is A = {«Xl,X2) , (Y1,Y2)) E R~21 Xl + Yl = X2 + Y2 = 1}. For every 
1" E [0,1]' the reduced Edgeworth box A(r) is equal to 
A(r) - {(1- r)e + ml a E A} 
= {«X1,X2), (Yl,Y2)) E AI Xl E [1- r, 1J ,X2 E [O,r]}. 
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Figure 5.2 
The indifference curve for agent i passing through bi (I') contains exactly the points that have 
the same distance with respect to the peak as bi (1·). Since the solution is efficient, it selects 
the unique l' for which the intersection point between these indifference curves hits the line 
connecting the two peaks. The agreed upon location is exactly this intersection point. Figure 
5.2 illustrates the solution, denoted by the point s. 
The solution for this location problem can be computed as fo11o\\·s. Let the solution be the 
location s = Aa + (1 - A)b, where A E [0,1]. It remains to compute >.. From the picture, it can 
be seen that 
Since 
d(a,b1(T)) d(a,s) = (1- >.)d(a, b), 
d(b, b2(T)) = d(b, s) = >.d(a, b) and 
d(e, b1(1')) = d(e, b2(1')) = 1·R. 
d( a, b1 (1')) + d( e, b1 (1')) = d( a, e) and 
d(b,b2(1')) +d(e,b2(1')) = d(b,e) 
\ve obtain A by solving the system: 
(1 - >.)d (a, b) + 7'R = d (a, e) 
>.d(a,b)+1'R = d(b,e). 
The unique solution of the system is equal to 
1'* = d(a, e) + d(b, e) - d (a, b) A* = ~ ~ d (b,e) - d(a,e) 
2R '2 + 2 d (a, b) 
Note that the facility is located exactly in the middle between the two peaks if they are 
equally distant from the status quo point. If agent i's peak is closer to the status quo point than 
the other agent's peak, the facility will be located nearer to agent i's peak. 
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For every l' ::; 1 ,ye have that h (r) = (lr, ~r) ,w (r) = (~r, ir) and the corresponding utilities 
are given by uh (1') = #,1' and Uw (r) = ~r, The solution, in terms of utilities, corresponds 
with the intersection point between the curve r ~ (Uh (1') , Uw (r)) and the curve of utility pairs 
induced by b + s = 1. Therefore, the solution (b*, s*) and the selected r* are obtained by solving 
the system 
1 2 3{4 3 1 4{27 
b'3s'3 = V 7jjr, b4S4 = V '256r and b + s = 1. 
The solution is (b*, s*) = (0.544,0.456) and 1'* = 0.914. 
6. Relation with the Kalai-Rosenthal Solution 
In this section, ,ye show that, for "regular" bargaining problems, the solution 'ljJ has a close 
connection to the Kalai-Rosenthal solution (Kalai and Rosenthal, 1978). A bargaining problem 
6 = (A, e, ~l, ~2) is called regular if for every 0 ::; l' < 1" ::; 1 we have that bier) -<i bi(1") 
for both i. Hence, blowing up the set of alternatives strictly increases the utility of the best 
alternatiye for both agents. For instance, a pure exchange economy with strictly monotonic 
preferences and interior initial endowment is always regular. 
Consider a bargaining problem 6 = (A, e, ~l, ~2) and a utility representation U = (UI, U2) 
of the preferences. Let S = {(uI(a),u2(a))) a E A} be the set of feasible utilities and d = 
(111(e),1L2(e)) the utility pair corresponding to the status quo point. Then, (S,d) represents a 
"welfarist" bargaining problem. 
For every 1" let 6(1') be the restriction of the bargaining problem 6 to A(r) and (S(1'),d) the 
induced welfarist bargaining problem. Here, we use the same utility representation u, irrespective 
of 1'. Note that e E A(1') and therefore dE S(r) for all 1'. 
\Ve will shmy that for any regular bargaining problem 6, there is a utility representation U 
of the preferences such that for every 1', the solution 'ljJ applied to 6(r) coincides with the Kalai-
Rosenthal solution of the induced welfarist bargaining problem (S(r),d). Hence, in particular, 
'ljJ applied to the 'large' problem 6 corresponds with the Kalai-Rosenthal solution of the induced 
welfarist problem (S,d). The solution 'ljJ can therefore be viewed as an ordinal extension of the 
Kalai-Rosenthal solution. 
The Kalai-Rosenthal solution is defined as follows. Let (S, d) be a welfarist bargaining 
problem with d = (dl ,d2). Let S be such that the efficient frontier in S is a strictly decreasing 
curve, connecting agent 2's best point with agent 1's best point, Let U1 and U2 be the maximal 
utilities for both agents in S. The Kalai-Rosenthal solution (KR) of (S, d) is the unique efficient 
point (UI, U2) E S for which 
UI - dl UI - d l 
---"--"::' = ~-...:. 
U2 - d2 U2 - d2 . 
Hence, the Kalai-Rosenthal solution is the intersection point between the line connecting d with 
the utopia point (UI , U2) , and the efficient frontier of S. 
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Consider a pure exchange economy with two agents and m perfectly divisible goods. Assume 
that the aggregate endowment of each good is normalized to 1 and that the initial endowment 
(el,e2) divides the total endowment equally among the agents; i.e. el = e2 = ~1, where 1 
denotes the individual bundle containing one unit of each good. Suppose that both agents have 
continuous preferences which are strictly monotonic in each good. 
The solution 'ljJ selects an efficient allocation (al,a2) and (implicitly) an r* E [0,1] such that 
each agent i is indifferent between ai and his best allocation in the reduced economy A(r*). Now, 
agent i's best choice from A(r*) is the bundle ei + 1·*(1-ei) = (r* + 1)~1. Hence, both agents 
are indifferent between the proposed allocation and the egalitarian reference bundle (1 + 1'*H 1. 
Since the solution 'ljJ is efficient, the selected allocation is a Pare to efficient egalitarian equivalent 
allocation (PEEEA). The reference bundle, moreover, is a multiple of the equal division bundle 
~1, which ensures that the allocation is envy-free (see Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978)." The 
following lemma is obtained. 
Lemma 7.1. Let E be a two-agent exc11ange economy with aggregate endowment 1, equal 
initial endowments for both agents and continuous, strictly monotonic preferences. Let a be the 
allocation selected by the solution 'ljJ, and let 1'* be such that both agents are indifferent between 
a and their best c1lOice in A(r*). Tllen, a is an envy-free PEEEA allocation with egalitarian 
reference bundle (1'* + 1 H 1. 
Crawford (1979) proposed a divide-and-choose mechanism which generates PEEEA in pure 
exchange economies. In view of the lemma above, the mechanism presented in this paper 
provides an alternative procedure to generate PEEEA. Applied to the special environment of 
an exchange economy with equal initial endowments, our mechanism works as follows. In the 
first round, agent 1 chooses an rE [0,1] and selects an allocation in the reduced economy A(r), 
where only a fraction r of the initial endowment can be traded. On the equilibrium path, agent 
1 will choose his best bundle in A(r), which is el + r(l-ed = (1 + r)!l, leaving the bundle 
(1- rH1 to agent 2. If agent 2 rejects this proposal, he can take his best bundle in A(r), which 
is (1 + 1')~1. If he accepts, agent 2 will choose his optimal allocation in the whole economy A, 
su b j ect to the restriction that agent 1 should not be worse off than in (1 + r) ~ 1, since otherwise, 
he will reject. Hence, once r is chosen by agent 1, agent 2 has the choice between the reference 
bundle (1 +1')!1 and his best bundle in A, given that agent 1 should not be worse off than with 
(1 + 1'Hl. 
In order to compare our mechanism with the Crawford procedure, we briefly describe the 
latter for the case of two agents. Crawford's divide-and-choose mechanism starts with an auction, 
in which both agents simultaneously bid some scalar multiple A of the egalitarian bundle ~1.5 
The agent with the highest bid, say A*, has to privilege to be divider; the other player is assigned 
chooser. The divider proposes some allocation a and the chooser can choose between a and the 
4 In fact, Pazner and Schmeidler show that choosing the reference bundle equal to a multiple of the equal division 
bundle is the only way to generate envy-free PEEEA in all two-person economies with convex preferences. Pazner 
and Schmeidler use the term fair allocations instead of envy-free allocations. 
5In the general version of the divide-and-choose mechanism, agents bid a multiple of some numeraire bundle 
x. \Ve choose x = ~1, since this corresponds to the mechanism that generates envy-free PEEEA. 
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In this paper we argue, however, that there is a meaningful way to extend the notion of 
egalitarian equh'alence to a more general class of bargaining situations. Suppose that the agents 
have agreed on an alternative a E A. One can not directly adopt the egalitarian equivalence 
principle for exchange economies, and say that a should be equivalent, for both agents, to some 
"fair" alternative b, which mayor may not be feasible in A. The notion of a "fair" alternative 
is meaningless in this general context. 
A possible solution to this problem is by saying that agents are not indifferent between a 
and some other (hypothetical) outcome, but are indifferent between a and some "fair" subset 
of alternatives F. By this, we mean that each agent should be indifferent between the solution 
outcome and his best alternative in the subset F. Important is that every agent can choose from 
the same, "fair" subset F. 
Defining "fair" subsets of alternatives in an abstract context is a problematic matter. Rather 
than exploring all possibilities, we have proposed a special family of subsets A(7'), namely those 
that are obtained by contracting the set A around the status quo point. In many examples, these 
reduced sets prove to give equal opportunities to both agents and can therefore be regarded as 
fair. 
2. Extensions of the solution. 
The properties of the solution, as well as its implementation by the mechanism and the 
axiomatic characterization, do not really depend on the specific choice of the reduced sets of 
alternatives A(1·). One could define a similar solution by choosing some other family of reduced 
sets A( 1'), with the property that A( 7') is continuously, monotonically increasing with respect to 
r, the set A(O) is equal to {e} and A(l) is equal to A. In this way, we actually obtain a class 
of bargaining solutions (one for each family of reduced sets) having the same properties as the 
solution presented in this paper. The same mechanism (up to the definition of A(r)) can be used 
to implement the solution, and the axiomatic characterization would be identical for all of them, 
after adapting the blow up monotonicity axiom to the new notion of A(r). In many economic 
examples, hO\\'ever, the particular choice of the reduced sets used for the solution 'l/J seems a 
natural one, as the reduced problems turn out to have the same characteristics as the original 
problem. This does by no means exclude the possibility that in some bargaining environments, 
another choice of reduced sets of alternatives may be plausible. 
A natural question is how the solution could be extended to the case of more than two 
agents. The answer to this question seems far from trivial, and is one of the objects of our 
present research. 
9. Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let (A, e) be given, let 0:1,1:2) be a pair of preference relations 
on A and let '11 = ('111,'112) be an arbitrary utility representation of (1:1,!:2)' We consider the 
bargaining problem B = (A, e, tl, 1:2). In order to reduce notation, we work in the feasible 
utility space induced by '11. We adopt the following conventions: 
By S = {(ul(a),'112(a))1 a E A} we denote the set of feasible utilities. A pair of utilities is 
typically denoted by (x, y), where x is agent l's utility and y is agent 2's utility. If we write, 
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Case 2. If xl 2: X(Y). If agent 2 accepts, we know from round 2 that the final outcome will 
be (Xl, Y(XI )). If agent 2 rejects, the final outcome is (x, Y(1')) E S(1'). 
Case 2.1. If Y (xl) > Y (1'). Then, agent 2 will accept xl and the final outcome is (xl, Y (xl)). 
Case 2.2. If Y(xl) < Y(1'). Then, agent 2 will reject xl and the final outcome is some 
(x, Y(1')) E S(1'). 
Claim 2. Let l' E [O,lJ be such that Y(X(1')) > Y(1'). Then, agent 1 can guarantee X(1') in 
a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Proof of claim 2. Let l' be such that Y(X(1')) > Y(1'). Let agent 1 choose l' and (xl,yl) = 
(X(1'), y) E S(1') at round 1. 
Case 1. If X(1') < X(Y). Then, we know from case 1 at round 1 that the final outcome will 
be (X(Y), Y). Since X(Y) > X(1'), agent 1 gets more than X(1'). 
Case 2. If X(T) 2: X(Y). Since Y(X(1')) > Y(1'), it follows from case 2.1 of round 1 that 
agent 2 ,,,ill accept the proposal and the final outcome will be (X(1'), Y(X(1')). 
So, in both cases agent 1 gets at least X(1'), which completes the proof of claim 1. 
Claim 3. Agent 1 can never get more than X(r*) in any subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Pmof of claim 3. Consider any subgame perfect equilibrium in which agent 1 chooses l' and 
(xl, yl) E S(1') at round 1. 
Case 1. If Xl < X(Y). Then, the final outcome will be (X(Y), Y). Since (X(1'*), Y(1'*)) is 
efficient, we have that X(1'*) 2: X(Y). So, agent 1 gets X(Y) :S X(1'*). 
Case 2. If xl 2: X(Y). 
Case 2.1. Agent 2 accepts (xl, yl ). Then, the final outcome is (xl, Y (xl)). Suppose that 
Xl > X(T*). By assumption on the preferences, the efficient frontier in S connects agent 2's 
best point with agent l's best point through a strictly decreasing curve. Or, equivalently, the 
function Y(x) is strictly decreasing for x 2: X(Y). Since xl > X(r*), we have that Y(xl ) < 
Y(X(1'*)) = Y(1'*). Since agent 2 can always guarantee Y(1') by rejecting agent l's proposal, 
it must hold that Y(xl ) 2: Y(1'). So, we have that Y(1') :S Y(xl) < Y(1'*), implying that 
l' < 1'*. Since (xl, yl) E S(1'), it holds that xl :S X(1'). Using the fact that l' < 1'*, we have 
xl :S X{1') :S X{1'*), which is a contradiction to the assumption that xl > X(1'*). Hence, we 
may conclude that xl ~ X(1'*). 
Case 2.2. Agent 2 rejects (xl,yl). Then, agent 2 chooses (x, Y(1')) E S(1') and this is the 
final outcome. 
Case 2.2.1. If l' :S 1'*. Then, x :S X(1') :S X(1'*). 
Case 2.2.2. If l' > 1'*. Then, Y(1') ~ Y(1'*) and x:S X(Y(1')) :S X(Y(1'*)) = X(1'*). 
So, in all the cases above, agent 1 gets less than X(T*), which completes the proof of our 
claim. 
Since by Claim 1, 1'* = max{1' E [0,1]1 Y(X(1')) ~ Y(1')}, claims 2 and 3 imply that in any 
subgame perfect equilibrium, agent 1 should obtain exactly X(1'*). 
Claim 4. In any subgame perfect equilibrium, agent 2 should get exactly Y(1'*). 
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